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A New Interpretation of the Contemporaneous 
Ownership Requirement in Shareholder  
Derivative Suits: In re Bank of New York  
Derivative Litigation and the Elimination of the 
Continuing Wrong Doctrine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s fierce business world some corporate directors feel the 
need to try anything possible to gain an edge, even if it means engaging 
in illegal business practices. Reports highlighting corporate corruption 
and greed frequent the news.1 Politicians around the nation are lining up 
to support harsher penalties for corporate abusers.2 The recent scandals 
involving Enron,3 WorldCom,4 and the Bank of New York.5 are a few of 
the more publicized examples of corporate corruption. The increase in 
the number of shareholder derivative suits is another sign of growing 
corporate corruption.6 While shareholder derivative suits are a common 
means through which shareholders enforce their rights, cunning investors 
may also abuse these suits to make a quick profit. For this reason it is 
important to protect the rights of shareholders to bring derivative actions 
while preventing cunning litigants from abusing such actions for 
personal profit. 
 1. See, e.g., Bill Press, The Enron Smoking Gun, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ 
ALLPOLITICS/02/06/column.billpress/index.html (Feb. 6, 2002). 
 2. See, e.g., John King, Bush to Propose Jail Time for Corporate Misconduct, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/09/bush.corporate.corruption/index.html (July 27, 
2002). 
 3. See generally In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
613–86 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining the relevant background of the Enron Corporation accounting 
scandal). 
 4. See generally SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining 
the relevant background of the WorldCom stock price inflation scandal). 
 5. See generally In re Bank of N.Y. Derivative Litig., 173 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195–97 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter Bank of N.Y. I.], aff’d, 320 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining the 
relevant background of the Bank of New York Russian banking scandal). 
 6. See 3 LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, TOXIC TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 29.12 (2003). 
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These competing interests have caused a split between the Second 
and Fifth Circuit courts of appeal7 concerning the scope and 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.8 Rule 23.1 
provides, in part, that any shareholder who brings a derivative suit must 
have owned shares in the corporation at the time the transaction 
complained of occurred.9 The Fifth Circuit has allowed an exception to 
this general rule—known as the “continuing wrong” doctrine.10 Under 
the continuing wrong doctrine, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit 
 7. Compare In re Bank of N.Y. Derivative Litig., 320 F.3d 291, 298–99 (2d Cir. 2003) 
[hereinafter Bank of N.Y. II.] (recognizing and refusing to apply the continuing wrong doctrine), with 
Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 130–31 (5th Cir. 1969) (recognizing and applying the 
continuing wrong doctrine). 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. Rule 23.1 provides the following: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right 
of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association 
having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall 
be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time 
of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff’s share or 
membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the 
action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it 
would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or 
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the 
reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The 
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in 
enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court 
directs. 
Id. 
 9. Id. Rule 23.1 provides that for a shareholder to establish federal derivative standing, the 
shareholder must allege that he or she “was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of 
which the plaintiff complains.” Id. This provision is known as the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement. 
 10. See Bateson, 414 F.2d at 130–31. Although the continuing wrong doctrine has been 
addressed, discussed, and sparingly used in other courts, no circuit has openly adopted the doctrine 
to the extent that the Fifth Circuit has. See generally Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315, 318 (10th Cir. 
1984) (holding that the trial court correctly held that even if the continuing wrong doctrine exists, it 
would not apply to the facts of the case); Ensign Corp., S.A. v. Interlogic Trace, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 
3497 (LBS), 1990 WL 213085, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1990) (discussing the continuing wrong 
doctrine as used by other courts); Pullman-Peabody Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 662 F. Supp. 32, 35–36 (D. 
Conn. 1986) (refusing to use the continuing wrong doctrine, despite the fact that other courts have 
used the doctrine to grant standing to plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits); In re Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co., 341 F. Supp. 845, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (granting standing to a plaintiff who did not own 
shares in the corporation at the time that the wrongful transaction was entered into because the 
transaction was a continuing wrong). Therefore, this Note will focus on the diverging interpretations 
of Rule 23.1 adopted by the Second and Fifth Circuits. 
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if the injurious effects of the alleged wrongful transaction continued 
while the shareholder owned shares in the corporation, even if the actions 
upon which the shareholder’s claim is based arose before his acquisition 
of shares in the corporation.11
Recently, the Second Circuit openly refused to accept the continuing 
wrong doctrine in In re Bank of New York Derivative Litigation 
(hereinafter Bank of N.Y. II).12 In its decision, the court decided to offer 
its own interpretation of Rule 23.1 rather than apply the continuing 
wrong doctrine. The court held that the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement of Rule 23.1 is not satisfied if the shareholder has not 
“owned stock in the corporation throughout the course of the activities 
that constitute the primary basis of the complaint.”13 The court clarified 
what constitutes the primary basis of a complaint by stating that the 
“plaintiff must have owned stock in the corporation before the core of the 
allegedly wrongful conduct transpired.”14 By establishing its “core of the 
conduct doctrine,” the Second Circuit correctly rejected the continuing 
wrong doctrine by stringently interpreting Rule 23.1 in a manner that (1) 
prevents shareholders from using the derivative suit to forum shop, (2) 
prevents shareholders from using the derivative suit to litigate 
“purchased grievances,” and (3) allows both courts and litigants to reach 
equitable results in shareholder derivative suits. 
This Note examines the differences between the Second and Fifth 
Circuits’ approaches when applying the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement. Part II begins with a brief background of shareholder 
derivative suits and concludes with a discussion of their modern 
development, focusing on Rule 23.1. Part III explains the factual and 
procedural background of Bank of N.Y. II, presents a brief synopsis of the 
majority opinion written by Judge José A. Cabranes,15 and contrasts the 
holding of the opinion with the modern day continuing wrong doctrine. 
Part IV examines the effects of the Bank of N.Y. II holding, focusing on 
its divergence from the continuing wrong doctrine and the future of the 
core of the conduct doctrine. Part V contains a brief conclusion. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that Bank of N.Y. II correctly eliminated the 
continuing wrong doctrine because the doctrine weakened the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1 to the point that it 
 11. See Bateson, 414 F.2d at 130–31. 
 12. See Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298–99. 
 13. Id. at 298. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 293. 
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did not effectively protect against litigation of purchased grievances, 
litigation by uninjured and uninterested shareholders, and manufactured 
federal diversity jurisdiction. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Origin of the Shareholder Derivative Suit 
The shareholder derivative suit originated in England’s nineteenth-
century courts of equity.16 As the Industrial Revolution spread across 
England and altered its economic landscape, individuals established 
corporations with greater frequency.17 The primary reason developers 
used the corporate structure during the Industrial Revolution was that it 
allowed them to secure funding for large ventures while minimizing their 
individual liability. As the number of individuals who owned corporate 
shares increased, friction and conflict strained the relationship between 
shareholders and corporate directors.18 Gradually, these conflicts 
induced the courts of equity to recognize that shareholders needed a way 
to protect the corporation from wrongdoing committed against it when, 
for various reasons, the corporate directors failed to do so.19 Thus, a new 
species of legal action, the shareholder derivative suit, was born. The 
concept behind the shareholder derivative suit was new in that it allowed 
one or more shareholders of a corporation to initiate a lawsuit on behalf 
of the corporation.20 Consequently, shareholders acquired the ability to 
enforce a corporate right or remedy a wrong against the corporation 
when the corporate directors failed to do so.21
By 1855, the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
shareholder derivative suit.22 As the shareholder derivative suit 
developed in the United States, it became apparent that the ability of 
shareholders to protect the corporation from harm was prone to two 
potential shareholder abuses.23 First, shareholders could forum shop by 
 16. Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge 
Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 99 (1998). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 99–103. 
 20. See id. at 99–101. 
 21. See 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2250 (2003). 
 22. See generally Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855); Kim, supra note 16, at 99. 
 23. See Kim, supra note 16, at 99–100. In her discussion of the development of the 
shareholder derivative suit, Kim explains: 
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transferring their corporate shares to out-of-state residents, thus allowing 
a new shareholder to litigate a preexisting derivative claim in federal 
court through manufactured federal diversity jurisdiction.24 Second, 
clever investors could realize corporate stock gains by purchasing shares 
in corporations for the sole purpose of litigating an existing shareholder 
derivative claim.25
The Supreme Court, prompted by these potential abuses of the 
shareholder derivative suit, established certain requirements that a 
shareholder must meet before bringing a derivative suit in federal 
court.26 The requirements established by the Supreme Court were later 
codified in the Equity Rules.27 and became part of the original Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.28 Although the federal standing requirements 
Under the basic corporate law paradigm, shareholders, as owners of the corporation, elect 
directors to manage the corporation on the shareholders’ behalf and to make decisions 
affecting the corporation, including the decision to initiate litigation. Shareholders who 
use unconstrained derivative proceedings to usurp the management authority of directors 
violate these basic principles of corporate governance. 
Id. at 100 (footnotes omitted). 
 24. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1828 (2d 
ed. 1986). 
 25. See id. The primary response to these problems was the creation of the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement: 
The requirement of an allegation of contemporaneous ownership originally was viewed 
as a means of discouraging the collusive practice of transferring stock to a nonresident for 
the purpose of manufacturing federal diversity jurisdiction in order to litigate a pre-
existing claim owned by the corporation in federal court. More recently, however, the 
provision has been described as a general principle of equity aimed at preventing the 
federal courts from being used to litigate purchased grievances. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 26. See generally Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881) (creating the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement for standing in a shareholder derivative suit). 
 27. See Kim, supra note 16, at 100. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (1937) (repealed 1966). Although the original Rule 23(b) varies 
from the modern Rule 23.1, both rules are substantially similar. Original Rule 23(b) provided: 
  In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more 
shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association 
refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be 
verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the 
transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by 
operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the 
United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. 
The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure 
from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such 
action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for 
not making such effort. 
Id. For the text of modern Rule 23.1, see supra note 8. 
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for shareholder derivative suits have been slightly altered from their 
original form, the contemporaneous ownership requirement contained in 
the original Rule 23(b) has been preserved and is currently articulated in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1—Derivative Actions by 
Shareholders.29
B. The Modern Development of Rule 23.1 
Rule 23.1 provides, in part, that a party bringing a derivative suit in 
federal court “[shall be] a shareholder or member at the time of the 
transaction of which the plaintiff complains.”30 This requirement was 
included in the original Rule 23(b) and was carried over into the modern 
Rule 23.1 to eliminate forum shopping and/or the litigation of purchased 
grievances.31 This “contemporaneous ownership” requirement is 
essential in maintaining the viability of the shareholder derivative suit.32
However, because Rule 23.1 does not specifically define 
“transaction,” confusion has arisen as to what constitutes a “transaction” 
for purposes of Rule 23.1. Based on a plain reading of Rule 23.1, it 
appears that a transaction is an event or series of events that create a legal 
right on behalf of the corporation.33 Nevertheless, Rule 23.1 fails to 
adequately define the boundaries of the events that constitute a wrongful 
transaction. This inadequate definition has created a situation in which 
courts have come to different conclusions about whether a shareholder 
who brings a derivative suit has to: (1) own shares in the corporation 
throughout the entire series of events that constitute the wrongful 
 29. See supra note 8. Modern Rule 23.1 and original Rule 23(b) contain equivalent language 
with reference to the contemporaneous ownership requirement. 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 31. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1828. Rule 23.1 derives from the decision in 
Hawes, 104 U.S. at 461. In Hawes, the Supreme Court held that 
an allegation that complainant was a shareholder at the time of the transactions of which 
he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by operation of law, and that 
the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction in a 
case of which it could otherwise have no cognizance, should be in the bill, which should 
be verified by affidavit. 
Id. 
 32. Rule 23.1 is essential because it (1) discourages the practice of purchasing corporate 
stock in corporations, which have suffered from illegal conduct on the part of corporate directors, for 
the purpose of bringing a shareholder derivative suit that will win damages for the corporation and 
subsequently increase the value of the investors shares in the corporation, and (2) prevents federal 
courts from being used to litigate purchased grievances. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 
1828. 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
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transaction;34 (2) own shares in the corporation during a portion of the 
series of events; or (3) own shares in the corporation at a point in time 
when the effects of the wrongful transaction continue,35 despite the fact 
that the underlying series of events that constitute the transaction were 
completed prior to the shareholder’s ownership.36
Despite the differing interpretations of Rule 23.1, federal courts have 
generally rejected the notion that the entire series of events that 
constitutes the wrongful conduct is a single transaction.37 However, 
based on the equitable history of the shareholder derivative suit, the Fifth 
Circuit has broadly interpreted the meaning of a Rule 23.1 transaction. 
The Fifth Circuit has held that a shareholder may bring a derivative suit 
for injuries suffered by the corporation prior to the shareholder’s 
purchase of shares in the corporation,38 thus interpreting the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement against the backdrop of the 
equitable doctrine of continuing wrong.39 Under the continuing wrong 
doctrine, shareholders obtain federal derivative standing when they 
acquire shares in the corporation after the Rule 23.1 transaction has 
occurred if they meet two conditions. First, the effects of the wrongful 
 34. See, e.g., Weinhaus v. Gale, 237 F.2d 197, 199–200 (7th Cir. 1956). 
 35. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d 291, 298–99 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the continuing 
wrong doctrine). 
 36. See, e.g., Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 37. See, e.g., Weinhaus, 237 F.2d at 199–200 (rejecting the continuing wrong doctrine); 
Pullman-Peabody Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 662 F. Supp. 32, 35–36 (D. Conn. 1986) (refusing to apply 
the continuing wrong doctrine); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1828. Wright, Miller, and Kane 
note the general attitude of federal courts toward the continuing wrong doctrine as follows: 
The federal courts generally have rejected the contention that the entire series of events 
constitutes a single transaction—the so-called “continuing wrong” notion—entitling 
plaintiff to bring suit for injuries suffered by the corporation subsequent to plaintiff’s 
acquisition of stock. Rather, plaintiff has been barred from complaining about events of 
this character on the theory that they assume their wrongful character as of the time of the 
initial event, which antedated plaintiff’s gaining shareholder status. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 38. The Fifth Circuit held that a shareholder who had owned stock in the corporation when 
the alleged wrongdoing occurred, then sold his stock in the corporation, and then reacquired stock in 
the corporation in order to file a derivative suit had standing to bring a shareholder derivative suit in 
federal court because 
one who buys stock in the corporation cannot maintain a stockholders’ derivative suit if 
the wrongs complained of were completed before his acquisition of stock. However, 
where the complaint charge[s] continuing wrongs, occurring at the time plaintiff owned 
stock, the complaint should not be dismissed on defendant’s contention that the claims 
actually arose prior to the time plaintiff acquired his stock. 
Bateson, 414 F.2d at 130 (citation omitted). 
 39. See id. 
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conduct must span the shareholder’s ownership of shares in the 
corporation.40 Second, the shareholder must have been injured by the 
effects of the wrongful conduct.41 On the other hand, in the years prior to 
the Bank of N.Y. II decision, the trend among courts within the Second 
Circuit was to not apply the continuing wrong doctrine when considering 
whether a shareholder derivative plaintiff had standing.42 While the Fifth 
Circuit maintains the validity of the continuing wrong doctrine,43 the 
Second Circuit’s complete rejection of the doctrine culminated in Bank 
of N.Y. II.44
III. IN RE BANK OF NEW YORK DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
A. The Facts 
Before the commencement of litigation, the Bank of New York 
(BONY) was a financial institution owned by the Bank of New York 
Company, Inc. (the Company), one of the largest bank holding 
companies in the United States.45 BONY operated as the principal 
subsidiary of the Company46 and engaged in widespread financial 
ventures throughout the United States and in many foreign nations. 
As the political atmosphere in Russia began to change during the late 
1980s, BONY became aware of opportunities to expand its business into 
the Russian banking industry.47 In 1990, BONY started planning its 
Russian expansion, and in 1992 it reorganized its European Division to 
create an Eastern European Division that would oversee and facilitate its 
expansion into the Russian market.48 BONY aggressively pursued this 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Ensign Corp., S.A. v. Interlogic Trace, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3497 (LBS), 1990 WL 
213085, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1990); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1828; Paul P. 
Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders.’ Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 1041, 1052–55 (1978). 
 42. See Seth Aronson et al., Recent Developments in Shareholder Derivative Actions, 1386 
PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 73, 82 (2003). While support within the Second Circuit prior to Bank of N.Y. II 
appears to be sparse at best, several courts recognized and discussed the doctrine. See Hoover v. 
Allen, 180 F. Supp. 263, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding that that the wrongs complained of were 
continuing in nature). 
 43. See Bateson, 414 F.2d at 130. 
 44. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 45. Id. at 294. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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expansion into the Russian banking industry despite governmental and 
market warnings that the Russian banking industry was rife with 
organized crime and substantial corruption.49
Several of the officers within BONY’s newly formed Eastern 
European Division created a scheme called “Prokutki,” or “spinning 
around,” designed to conceal the illegal movement of certain assets, 
primarily U.S. dollars, out of Russia.50 The illegally removed funds were 
then laundered through multiple offshore accounts as the Eastern 
European Division officers behind the scheme took a percentage of the 
total value of the assets as their commission.51 The Eastern European 
Division officers managing the Prokutki scheme maintained the secrecy 
of their operations and communications through an encryption code.52 In 
addition, the scheme was marketed to other Russian banks.53
The Prokutki scheme was established in 1992, became fully 
operational that year, and continued to be used throughout the mid-
1990s.54 The scheme was eventually discovered by BONY’s 
competitors. In 1998, the Republic Bank of New York detected unusual 
volumes of BONY transfers to Russian accounts. As a result, it filed a 
Suspicious Activity Report with the Treasury Department.55 This 
Suspicious Activity Report prompted an FBI investigation that led to the 
indictment of several BONY employees, two of whom pled guilty to 
illegal conduct that occurred as recently as 1999.56 In addition, the FBI 
investigation and subsequent CIA investigations uncovered links 
between BONY’s Prokutki scheme and an alleged Russian organized 
crime leader reportedly involved in activities such as arms trafficking, 
extortion, and organized prostitution.57
On August 19, 1999, news of BONY’s Prokutki scheme became 
public when the New York Times reported that through March 1999, $4.2 
billion, much of which was connected to Russian organized crime, had 
 49. Bank of N.Y. I, 173 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 320 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
 50. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 294. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Bank of N.Y. I, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
 54. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 294. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Raymond Bonner & Timothy L. O’Brien, Activity at Bank Raises Suspicions of Russia 
Mob Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1999, at A1. 
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been laundered in BONY accounts.58 In response to the publicity that the 
Prokutki scheme received in the media and the continued FBI 
investigation, BONY formed an Anti-Money Laundering Oversight 
Committee in September 1999. The oversight committee examined what 
was considered “unusual activity,” but due to the limited power of the 
oversight committee, most of the Russian banking ventures conducted by 
the Eastern European Division continued.59
B. Procedural History 
Mildred and Edward Kaliski purchased shares in BONY on July 21, 
1998.60 They filed a shareholder derivative suit on behalf of BONY and 
the Company on September 23, 1999, in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York.61 The derivative action named as 
defendants various officers and directors of both BONY and the 
Company.62 The named defendants included the directors and officers 
directly responsible for the Prokutki scheme (the Officers).63 In their 
complaint, the Kaliskis claimed that the Officers breached their fiduciary 
duties64 to BONY and the Company by “‘fail[ing] to fully inform 
 58. Id. (“Money laundering is a legal catch phrase that refers to the criminal practice of 
taking ill-gotten gains and moving them through a sequence of bank accounts so they ultimately look 
like legitimate profits from legal businesses.”). 
 59. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 294 (quoting Am. Compl., Sept. 1, 2000, ¶ 171). The true 
direction and breadth of the investigation conducted by the Anti-Money Laundering Oversight 
Committee created by BONY is unclear. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the oversight 
committee did little to stop or remedy the wrongful behavior that BONY’s Eastern European 
Division committed. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 294–95. 
 62. Id. 
 63. For convenience, the BONY and Company directors involved in the Prokutki scheme and 
the ill-advised entry into the Russian banking industry will be referred to as the Officers. This should 
not be understood to include all the directors or officers of either BONY or the Company. 
 64. The Kaliskis claimed, in particular, that the various officers and directors of BONY and 
of the Company who were named defendants breached their fiduciary duties by “‘fail[ing] to 
implement and enforce an adequate compliance system or to adequately oversee the development of 
the business in derogation of their duties to implement compliance controls.’” Bank of N.Y. II, 320 
F.3d at 295 (quoting Am. Compl., Sept. 1, 2000, ¶ 193). In addition, the Kaliskis claimed that the 
directors of BONY and the Company “‘ignored multiple, specific warnings issued by governmental, 
regulatory, and private security sources that the Russian banking system was being infiltrated by 
organized crime—a fact recognized by other banks in the United States, which began to scale down 
their Russian operations.’” Id. (quoting Am. Compl., Sept. 1, 2000, ¶ 171). To support their claims, 
the Kaliskis introduced newspaper articles, magazine articles, Russian banking reports, and 
governmental reports from 1991 to 1994 that warned of money laundering and corruption in the 
Russian banking system. Id. 
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themselves [about the Russian banking industry] to the extent reasonably 
appropriate under the circumstances.’”65
Although the Kaliskis acknowledged in their complaint that the 
majority of the wrongful conduct associated with the Prokutki scheme 
occurred between 1992 and 1996, they claimed that a significant amount 
of the illegal conduct continued into the late 1990s.66 The Kaliskis 
claimed, for example, that after 1996 the Officers made numerous 
telephone calls and conducted meetings concerning the structure of their 
Prokutki scheme, the percentages of each individual’s commission, and 
the general movement of the laundered Russian assets.67 Furthermore, 
the Kaliskis claimed that, beyond 1996, the Officers made numerous 
computer entries that reflected their individual shares in the offshore 
companies through which they routed the Russian assets and that the 
Officers maintained a continuous relationship with the Russian banks 
that they solicited to become part of the Prokutki scheme.68 Finally, 
through discovery, the Kaliskis obtained BONY reports and wire 
transfers indicating that the Officers’ relationships with the Russian 
banks using the Prokutki scheme continued into 2000 and that the 
Officers may have continued transferring money out of Russia through 
the Prokutki scheme after the Kaliskis purchased their BONY shares in 
1998.69 Ultimately, the Kaliskis’ standing depended on their claim that 
even though the Prokutki scheme was created and put in place between 
1992 and 1996, it continued in use until 2000, during which time the 
Officers regularly met and communicated for the purpose of maintaining 
the profitability of the scheme. 
On August 31, 2001, the Officers filed a motion to dismiss the 
Kaliskis’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).70 
 65. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Am. Compl., Sept. 1, 2000, ¶ 193). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 296. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
provides the following: 
  After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any 
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). 
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They claimed that the Kaliskis lacked standing to bring a shareholder 
derivative suit on behalf of BONY and the Company because they did 
not meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1.71 
Specifically, the Officers argued that the alleged wrongful transaction—
BONY’s ill-advised entry into the Russian banking industry and their 
creation and implementation of the Prokutki scheme—occurred before 
the Kaliskis purchased their BONY shares in 1998. The Kaliskis 
responded by arguing that they did have standing to bring a shareholder 
derivative action because even though they bought their BONY shares 
after the illegal conduct of the Officers began, the illegal conduct 
continued after they bought their BONY shares and into 2000.72 The trial 
court granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
Kaliskis did not own BONY shares when the illegal conduct occurred.73 
The Kaliskis appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.74
C. The Holding of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
On February 12, 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of 
the district court.75 The court held, inter alia, that the Kaliskis did not 
have standing to bring a shareholder derivative suit against the Officers 
on behalf of BONY and the Company because they did not meet the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1.76 The court held 
that for the Kaliskis to satisfy the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement of Rule 23.1, they must have owned shares in the Company 
“throughout the course of the activities that constitute the primary basis 
of the complaint.”77 The Second Circuit also held that the Prokutki 
scheme concluded in 1996 when the majority of the wrongful conduct 
associated with the scheme was complete.78
 71. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 296; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (requiring that the plaintiff 
be a shareholder “at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Bank of N.Y. I, 173 F. Supp. 2d 193, 198, 200–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 320 F.3d 291 
(2d Cir. 2003). The district court recognized that some courts have held that the continuing wrong 
doctrine is a valid exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule, yet the district court refused to 
use the exception because “it is unclear whether the doctrine is the law of this Circuit.” Id. at 198. 
The district court granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss because the Kaliskis did not own stock 
during the course of the transaction. See id. at 201. 
 74. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 297. 
 75. Id. at 301. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 298–99. 
 78. Id. at 299. 
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Although there were lingering effects, continued communications, 
and new transactions relating to the Prokutki scheme from 1996 to 2000, 
the court ultimately concluded that the transaction described in the 
complaint only included BONY’s expansion into the Russian banking 
industry from 1992 to 1996.79 Because the Kaliskis did not purchase 
their shares in the Company until 1998, the court held that they failed to 
meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1.80
In reaching its decision, the court recognized the conflict between the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement and the continuing wrong 
doctrine. On the one hand, the Second Circuit recognized that generally 
“[w]hen a series of wrongful transactions is alleged and some of them 
transpired before plaintiff became a shareholder but others took place 
subsequent to that date, the shareholder’s action may be maintained only 
on the basis of the later events.”81 Yet, on the other hand, the court 
acknowledged the existence of the continuing wrong doctrine and its use 
in the Fifth Circuit.82 Ultimately, the court stated that even if it adopted 
the continuing wrong doctrine, the Kaliskis would not have standing 
because they did not provide sufficient evidence to support their claim 
that BONY’s wrongful conduct continued after they purchased their 
shares in the corporation.83
Having recognized the conflict between the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement and the continuing wrong doctrine, the Second 
Circuit split from the Fifth Circuit by declining to adopt “the expansive 
definition of the term ‘transaction’ that is inherent in the continuing 
wrong doctrine.”84 The Second Circuit stated that, for purposes of Rule 
23.1, a transaction does not include illegal conduct that began prior to 
and continued after a shareholder’s purchase of corporate stock. The 
court then redefined transaction for purposes of Rule 23.1 by stating that 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 298–99. 
 81. Id. at 297 (alteration in original) (quoting 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1828). 
 82. Although the Second Circuit would ultimately refuse to accept the continuing wrong 
doctrine, it did acknowledge its use in other circuits: 
Some courts have held that an entire series of events constitutes a single transaction 
entitling a plaintiff to bring suit for injuries suffered by the corporation subsequent to the 
plaintiff’s acquisition of stock as long as the same series of events continued after the 
plaintiffs acquired their shares. This interpretation of the term “transaction” is known as 
the continuing wrong doctrine. 
Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (citing 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1828). 
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the contemporaneous ownership requirement is met when a shareholder 
“own[s] stock in the corporation throughout the course of the activities 
that constitute the primary basis of the complaint.”85
While the Second Circuit clearly refused to accept the broad 
interpretation of transaction inherent in the continuing wrong doctrine, 
the court did not fully define the limits of its new interpretation of the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement. The court briefly cited a 
district court holding that “‘the continuing wrong doctrine is less an 
exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule than an expansive 
definition of what constitutes a ‘transaction’ as that term is used in Rule 
23.1.’”86 The court did, however, clearly reject the notion that the 
shareholder must own stock in the company during the entire course of 
all relevant events.87 In an apparent attempt to avoid a brightline rule that 
would inhibit future courts from employing equitable principles to 
achieve a correct result, the Second Circuit held that when applying its 
new interpretation of the contemporaneous ownership requirement, 
courts should approach the issue as a “fact-specific question to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.”88 The court explained that if a trial 
court determines that “a single, ongoing transaction is involved, the 
plaintiff must have acquired stock in the company before all of the core 
conduct occurred in order to bring suit.”89 On the other hand, the court 
explained that if the trial court determines that “the allegedly wrongful 
conduct consists of a series of separate transactions, a plaintiff may assert 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Ensign Corp. v. Interlogic Trace, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3497 (LBS), 1990 WL 
213085, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1990)). 
 87. The Second Circuit made sure to clarify that its new interpretation of the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement did not require stock ownership during the course of all 
relevant events. 
As an initial matter, we decline to adopt the expansive definition of the term 
“transaction” that is inherent in the continuing wrong doctrine. Instead, we hold that, in 
order to invoke derivative standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 and 
New York Business Corporation Law § 626(b), a plaintiff must have owned stock in the 
corporation throughout the course of the activities that constitute the primary basis of the 
complaint. This is not to say that a plaintiff must have owned stock in the company 
during the entire course of all relevant events. It does mean, however, that a proper 
plaintiff must have acquired his or her stock in the corporation before the core of the 
allegedly wrongful conduct transpired. 
Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 88. Id. at 298 n.4. 
 89. Id. 
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standing over those transactions for which the core conduct occurred 
after the plaintiff acquired stock in the company.”90
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Bank of N.Y. II raises several 
questions. While it is apparent from the court’s opinion that the Second 
Circuit officially rejects the continuing wrong doctrine,91 it is unclear 
what effect its new “core of the conduct” doctrine will ultimately have on 
the contemporaneous ownership requirement. Does the core of the 
conduct doctrine establish a new method of applying the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement that is genuinely different from 
the continuing wrong doctrine? What effect will the core of the conduct 
doctrine have on shareholder derivative suits and how will it be applied? 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s core of the conduct doctrine establishes 
a new method of applying the contemporaneous ownership requirement 
that is genuinely different from the continuing wrong doctrine and more 
fully accomplishes the purposes of Rule 23.1. 
A. The Divergence of the Core of the Conduct Doctrine from the 
Continuing Wrong Doctrine 
In Bank of N.Y. II, the Second Circuit recognized the historical 
existence of the continuing wrong doctrine but openly refused to adopt 
it.92 In theory, its ruling eliminated the common law continuing wrong 
doctrine by requiring that a shareholder “own[] stock in the corporation 
throughout the course of the activities that constitute the primary basis of 
the complaint.”93 But what does this mean? In determining what 
constitutes “the primary basis of the complaint,”94 the court focused on 
whether the shareholder owned stock in the corporation when the “core” 
of the wrongful conduct occurred.95 Therefore, while the Second Circuit 
did adopt a new interpretation of the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement96 by expressly excluding the continuing wrong doctrine 
 90. Id. at 298 n.4. 
 91. Id. at 298; see also supra Part III.C. 
 92. See Bank of N.Y. II, 330 F.3d at 298. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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from its new view of contemporaneous ownership,97 it remains unclear 
what its core of the conduct doctrine really is. Could it be interpreted as 
broadly as the continuing wrong doctrine? In order to better understand 
the core of the conduct doctrine it is helpful to examine its divergence 
from the continuing wrong doctrine. 
1. The continuing wrong doctrine 
The equitable origins of the shareholder derivative suit.98 have led 
courts to create the continuing wrong doctrine as a means of balancing 
the strict standing requirements of Rule 23.1 with the desire to grant 
relief to shareholders when corporate directors fail to protect the legal 
rights of the corporation. This struggle has caused some courts to 
excessively erode the Rule 23.1 protections inherent in the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement by creating the continuing 
wrong doctrine. The clearest definition and use of this doctrine is found 
in Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp.99
In Bateson, the shareholder filed a derivative suit on behalf of Magna 
Oil against the corporation’s directors for alleged acts of fraud, 
mismanagement, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty.100 The 
plaintiff, a long-time shareholder in Magna Oil, acquired stock in the 
corporation in 1956.101 Despite the fact that the plaintiff claimed he 
knew of the directors’ improprieties, and in fact planned to bring a 
shareholder derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, he inadvertently 
sold all of his stock in the corporation on May 5, 1967.102 On July 21, 
1967, the plaintiff reacquired one hundred shares of stock in the 
corporation and shortly thereafter filed a derivative suit on behalf of the 
corporation.103
Specifically, the Bateson plaintiff alleged that the directors engaged 
in five wrongful transactions. First, the plaintiff alleged that Howell, one 
of the directors, caused the corporation “to advance him money on open 
account and promissory note.”104 Second, the plaintiff claimed that 
Howell caused the corporation to purchase an airplane that was 
 97. Id. (citing 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 1828). 
 98. See Kim, supra note 16, at 99. 
 99. 414 F.2d 128, 130–31 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 100. See id. at 129. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at 129–31. 
 103. See id. at 129. 
 104. Id. 
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predominantly used for Howell’s personal enjoyment.105 Third, the 
plaintiff accused Howell of causing the corporation “to pay him and his 
brother excessive salaries and expense allowances.”106 Fourth, the 
plaintiff alleged that Howell caused the corporation to mortgage its 
property at nearly prohibitive interest rates to secure payment of his 
personal debts.107 And fifth, the plaintiff claimed that Howell and the 
other directors mismanaged the corporation’s oil and gas properties.108
The plaintiff’s failure to maintain ownership of shares of stock in 
Magna Oil from 1956 until the suit’s filing forced the Fifth Circuit to 
face the question of how to apply the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement of Rule 23.1. Although the court does not give dates for the 
five wrongful transactions alleged by the plaintiff, it appears from the 
court’s discussion that all of the wrongful transactions alleged by the 
plaintiff were completed prior to plaintiff.’s reacquisition of shares in 
Magna Oil.109 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
wrongful transactions were continuing when plaintiff reacquired shares 
in the corporation.110
As announced in Bateson, the Fifth Circuit’s view of the term 
“transaction” in Rule 23.1 is broad enough to include the latent effects of 
completed transactions, purchases, and agreements. The advancement of 
money, the purchase of an airplane, the agreement to pay a set salary, 
and the mortgaging of property to pay a personal debt were transactions 
that were entered into and completed prior to the plaintiff’s acquisition of 
stock in July 1967. Nevertheless, for the Fifth Circuit the fact that the 
plaintiff owned stock when funds were still available, an airplane was 
still used, salaries were paid, and interest was incurred was sufficient to 
hold that the plaintiff was a shareholder in the corporation at the time of 
the wrongful transactions.111
Therefore, the continuing wrong doctrine provides that the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement is met if the plaintiff is injured 
by a transaction or wrong that “spans the plaintiff.’s ownership” of shares 
in the corporation, “if new elements in a pattern of wrongful conduct 
occur after” the plaintiff acquires shares in the corporation, or if the 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 128, 131. 
 110. Id. at 130. 
 111. See id. at 130–31. 
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direct effects of the wrongful transaction continue unremedied when the 
plaintiff acquires shares in the corporation.112
This doctrine clearly loosens the standing restrictions imposed on 
shareholder derivative plaintiffs by Rule 23.1. Until a wrong is corrected 
or remedied, one may reasonably argue that the wrong is continuing.113 
because the transaction’s effects, both public and private, continue to 
injure and damage the corporation, even though the underlying actions 
and events that produced the wrongful transaction may have been 
completed long ago. Therefore, a court that applied the continuing wrong 
doctrine could reasonably grant federal derivative standing to any 
plaintiff who puts in issue an alleged wrongful transaction that has not 
been corrected or remedied when the suit is filed, even if the plaintiff 
purchased shares in the corporation long after the underlying actions and 
events that produced the wrongful transaction occurred.114
2. The core of the conduct doctrine 
It is clear from the Second Circuit’s language that their creation of 
the core of the conduct doctrine was impacted by their desire to formally 
diverge from the excessive manner in which the continuing wrong 
doctrine erodes the protections of the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement.115 The core of the conduct doctrine establishes a more 
stringent interpretation of the contemporaneous ownership requirement 
than the Fifth Circuit’s continuing wrong doctrine by requiring 
shareholder derivative plaintiffs to acquire shares in the corporation 
before the core of the alleged wrongful transaction occurred.116 What 
may be questioned, however, is whether the Second Circuit’s core of the 
conduct doctrine leaves any room for results similar to those reached 
through the use of the continuing wrong doctrine. This question arises 
from the Second Circuit’s limited definition of the “core” of a wrongful 
transaction and the fact that this creates room for some judicial 
interpretation, but ultimately there are several reasons why the core of 
the conduct doctrine will not produce results similar to those of the 
continuing wrong doctrine. 
 112. See id. at 130–31 (quoting Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Business Associations, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1467, 1468–69 (1960)); 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2331 (2003); Aronson et al., supra note 42, 
at 82. 
 113. See 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2332 (2003). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d 291, 298–99 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 116. See id. at 298. 
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The Second Circuit clearly stated that its view of the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement does not include the continuing 
wrong doctrine.117 The court refused “to adopt the expansive definition 
of the term ‘transaction’ that is inherent in the continuing wrong 
doctrine.”118 This expansive definition of a transaction includes the 
unremedied injurious effects of an otherwise completed transaction, such 
as the illegitimate use of an airplane purchased by a corporation prior to 
the plaintiff.’s acquisition of shares in that corporation.119 Therefore, by 
rejecting the broad interpretation of transaction inherent in the continuing 
wrong doctrine, the court showed that the core of a wrongful transaction 
consists of more than the injurious effects of an unremedied wrongful 
transaction. 
It may be argued, however, that despite the Second Circuit’s open 
rejection of the continuing wrong doctrine, the net effect of Bank of N.Y. 
II was to replace one broad doctrine of the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement with another. After all, the core of the conduct doctrine rests 
upon a determination of what events constitute the “core” of a wrongful 
transaction. The court’s limited definition of what constitutes the “core” 
of a wrongful transaction allows for the possibility that judicial 
interpretation of the core of the conduct doctrine could produce results 
similar to those under the continuing wrong doctrine. Despite this 
inherent weakness in the court’s opinion, its discussion of the core of the 
conduct doctrine strongly supports the conclusion that the core of a 
wrongful transaction must include some portion of the creation, 
organization, or implementation of the wrongful transaction, not just the 
injurious effects of an unremedied wrongful transaction.120
The court separates wrongful transactions into two classes: 
continuous transactions and discrete transactions.121 Whether a wrongful 
transaction is continuous or discrete “is a fact-specific question to be 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 129–31 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the 
alleged wrongdoings, including the improper use of a airplane purchased by the corporation prior to 
the plaintiffs acquisition of shares in the corporation, were continuing at the time plaintiff acquired 
shares in the corporation); supra Part IV.A.1. 
 120. See generally Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298 n.4 (discussing two forms of transactions 
and what constitutes the core of each). 
 121. Id. 
ROB-PP3 5/11/2005 12:08:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
248 
 
decided on a case-by-case basis.”122 The court held that if a continuous 
transaction—“a single, ongoing transaction”123—is involved, “the 
plaintiff must have acquired stock in the company before all of the core 
conduct occurred in order to bring suit.”124 On the other hand, the court 
held that if discrete transactions—“wrongful conduct [that] consists of a 
series of separate transactions”125—are involved, the “plaintiff may 
assert standing over those transactions for which the core conduct 
occurred after the plaintiff acquired stock in the company.”126 Whether 
the transaction is discrete or continuous, valid derivative standing would 
require that the plaintiff acquire shares in the company before all of the 
core conduct for each distinct transaction occurred. 
For this reason, the Second Circuit denied standing to the 
Kaliskis.127 Even though they acquired BONY shares prior to the total 
shut down of the Prokutki scheme (a continuous transaction),128 they did 
not acquire their shares prior to the creation, organization, or 
implementation of the scheme. Therefore, even though the Second 
Circuit does explain what events constitute the “core conduct” of a 
transaction, it is likely from their holding in Bank of N.Y. II that, in the 
court’s view, the “core conduct” of a wrongful transaction includes the 
creation, organization, or implementation of the transaction. Future 
courts should take this approach when determining what constitutes the 
“core conduct” of a wrongful transaction in order to follow the Second 
Circuit’s clear intent to create a more stringent interpretation of the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement than currently found in the 
continuing wrong doctrine. As a consequence, the holding in Bank of 
N.Y. II eliminates the continuing wrong doctrine in the Second Circuit. 
 122. Id. (“Whether the conduct at issue in a given complaint amounts to a continuous 
transaction or a series of discrete transactions is a fact-specific question to be decided on a case-by-
case basis.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 297–99. 
 128. Although the court does not expressly state that the Prokutki scheme was a continuous 
transaction, it is apparent from their language that it was. Had the scheme been considered a discrete 
transaction by the court the Kaliskis’ claim would have been allowed on those portions of the 
Prokutki scheme that occurred after they acquired BONY stock. 
5ROB-FIN 5/11/2005 12:08:13 PM 
229] The Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement 
 249 
 
B. The Continuing Wrong Doctrine Versus the Core of the  
Conduct Doctrine 
Because the core of the conduct doctrine articulated by the Second 
Circuit in Bank of N.Y. II eliminates the continuing wrong doctrine, it is 
now necessary to determine whether that decision was correct and how 
Rule 23.1 will now operate within the Second Circuit. 
Rule 23.1 protects against potential abuses of the shareholder 
derivative suit by (1) “prevent[ing] potential derivative plaintiffs from 
‘buying a lawsuit’ by purchasing stock,”129 (2) “insur[ing] that derivative 
actions are brought by shareholders who have actually suffered injury 
and have an interest in the outcome of the case,”130 and (3) preventing 
shareholders from manufacturing federal diversity jurisdiction by 
transferring their stock to an out-of-state resident.131 Despite the 
equitable foundation of the continuing wrong doctrine, the doctrine 
weakens these three protections, while the core of the conduct 
doctrine132 found in Bank of N.Y. II strengthens them. The center of the 
core of the conduct doctrine rests upon the court’s definition of what 
constitutes the “core” of a transaction. The Second Circuit stated that its 
view of what constitutes the core of a wrongful transaction is not so 
broad as to include all relevant events, but as suggested above, likely 
includes the creation, organization, or implementation of the 
transaction.133 The simple fact pattern that follows demonstrates that the 
Second Circuit correctly rejected the continuing wrong doctrine because 
the doctrine makes it more probable that the shareholder derivative suit 
will be used as a vehicle to litigate purchased grievances, will be used by 
uninjured shareholders, and will be used to manufacture federal diversity 
jurisdiction. 
Suppose the director of a large corporation causes the corporation to 
enter into a transaction that violates state law. Initially, the wrongful 
transaction causes substantial damage to the corporation and its 
shareholders. After the transaction is completed, the director uses his 
influence to ensure that damages from the transaction are not remedied, 
 129. Bank of N.Y. I, 173 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 320 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Ensign Corp., S.A. v. Interlogic Trace, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3497 (LBS), 1990 WL 
213085, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1990)). 
 130. Id. (quoting Ensign, 1990 WL 213085, at *2). 
 131. 7C WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 24, § 1828. 
 132. See supra Part II.B. 
 133. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298 n.4. 
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thereby causing further nominal losses to the corporation and its 
shareholders on a monthly basis. Although the damaging effects of the 
harmful transaction are not yet widely known, a private investor learns of 
the wrongful transaction through a friend who owns shares in the 
corporation and resides in the state where the corporation is incorporated. 
The friend sells his shares to the investor at above fair market value, after 
which the investor files a shareholder derivative suit in federal court 
based on diversity jurisdiction. The investor argues that his stock 
ownership meets the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 
23.1 because the injurious effects of the wrongful transaction remained 
unremedied when he purchased his shares in the corporation, thus 
satisfying the continuing wrong doctrine. 
Although this fact pattern may be simple, it demonstrates the flaws 
of the continuing wrong doctrine. Under the continuing wrong doctrine, 
derivative standing exists if the shareholder acquires shares before the 
injurious effects of the wrongful transaction are remedied.134 Even 
though the transaction was essentially completed before the investor 
acquired shares in the corporation, its injurious effects continued at the 
time the investor acquired his shares, thus meeting the requirements of 
the continuing wrong doctrine.135 Therefore, applying the continuing 
wrong doctrine would undermine all three of the shareholder derivative 
suit protections contained in Rule 23.1136 by granting standing to a 
plaintiff who is litigating a purchased grievance, is not a shareholder that 
was truly harmed by the wrongful transaction, and has manufactured 
federal diversity jurisdiction. 
While such a situation could reasonably happen if courts apply the 
continuing wrong doctrine, the Second Circuit’s core of the conduct 
doctrine would prevent such a situation. Under the core of the conduct 
doctrine, the investor would be denied standing upon the court’s finding 
that the core of the transaction—the wrongful transaction that the 
director caused the company to enter into—was completed prior to the 
investor’s acquisition of shares in the corporation.137
This fact pattern highlights the fatal flaw of the continuing wrong 
doctrine. The continuing wrong doctrine undermines the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement by defining the term 
 134. See Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 130–31 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the 
injurious effects of an unremedied wrongful transaction are continuing wrongs); supra Part IV.A.1. 
 135. See supra note 132. 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 129–31. 
 137. See Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298–99 (describing the core of the conduct test). 
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“transaction” so broadly that it strips the requirement of any power. 
Under the continuing wrong doctrine, shareholders can more easily 
litigate purchased grievances because plaintiffs can show, with relatively 
little effort, that the effects of the wrongful transaction have gone 
unremedied. Likewise, the ease with which shareholders can satisfy the 
continuing wrong doctrine makes it nearly impossible to “insure that 
derivative actions are brought by shareholders who have actually 
suffered injury and have an interest in the outcome of the case.”138 
Finally, shareholders are not effectively barred from manufacturing 
federal diversity jurisdiction because the continuing wrong doctrine 
allows the transfer of corporate shares to a new shareholder who may 
then initiate the litigation so long as the underlying transaction is not 
remedied and the effects of the transaction continue. 
The Second Circuit’s holding in Bank of N.Y. II is superior to the 
continuing wrong doctrine because it is more closely aligned with the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement, thus safeguarding the 
protections of Rule 23.1 while still allowing plaintiffs to receive 
equitable results for actual injuries. Bank of N.Y. II does not require that 
the shareholder own shares in the corporation during the entire course of 
events that constitutes the wrongful transaction.139 Rather, the Second 
Circuit requires that the shareholder have owned shares in the 
corporation before the core of the wrongful conduct transpired.140 This 
requirement prevents shareholders from litigating purchased grievances 
because it ensures that they actually suffered from the wrongful 
transaction and have a stake in the outcome of the case. In addition, the 
Second Circuit’s core of the conduct doctrine prevents forum shopping 
by making it nearly impossible for a shareholder to transfer her corporate 
shares to an out-of-state resident without violating the contemporaneous 
ownership test. 
Finally, the core of the conduct doctrine still allows the court to 
achieve equitable results. This doctrine clearly sets a higher standard 
than the continuing wrong doctrine, but it does not establish a bright-line 
rule.141 It is unclear where the core of the conduct doctrine lies on the 
spectrum between continuous injurious effects and all relevant events 
because the court also held that the doctrine’s application is fact 
 138. Bank of N.Y. I, 173 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Ensign Corp., S.A. v. 
Interlogic Trace, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3497 (LBS), 1990 WL 213085, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1990)). 
 139. See Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See supra Part III.C. 
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specific.142 As a result, judges will still be able to achieve equitable 
results when deciding what constitutes the core of a wrongful 
transaction. They will not be able to extend derivative standing as far as 
the continuing wrong doctrine allowed, but it appears that the Second 
Circuit’s limited definition of the core of a transaction gives judges a 
little wiggle room for equitable considerations. Shareholder derivative 
plaintiffs will be able to appeal to a judge’s discretion by arguing that 
those portions of the transaction that preceded their purchase of shares in 
the corporation did not constitute the core of the wrongful transaction 
unless augmented by the portions of the transaction that followed their 
purchase of corporate shares. Therefore, judges will theoretically be able 
to reach equitable results by broadly determining what constitutes the 
core of the transaction when equity lies on the side of the shareholder. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Bank of N.Y. II, the Second Circuit correctly eliminated the 
continuing wrong doctrine some courts had read into Rule 23.1 in 
shareholder derivative suits.143 The continuing wrong doctrine allowed 
shareholders to meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of 
Rule 23.1 even though they may have acquired corporate shares after the 
underlying transactions were completed but not yet remedied.144 This 
broad exception weakened the contemporaneous ownership requirement 
of Rule 23.1 to the point that it did not effectively protect against 
litigation of purchased grievances, litigation by uninjured and 
uninterested shareholders, and manufactured federal diversity 
jurisdiction. 
The Second Circuit rejected the continuing wrong doctrine and 
provided a new interpretation of the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement, the core of the conduct doctrine. This new doctrine 
maintains the viability of the contemporaneous ownership requirement 
by requiring shareholders who bring derivative suits to have owned 
shares in the corporation throughout the course of the activities (defined 
as owning shares before the core of the wrongful acts occurred) that 
constitute the primary basis of the complaint.145 The core of the conduct 
 142. See Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298 n.4. 
 143. Id. at 298. 
 144. See generally Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 129–31 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(granting shareholder derivative standing to a shareholder who acquired shares in the corporation 
after the underlying transactions were completed but not yet remedied). 
 145. Bank of N.Y. II, 320 F.3d at 298. 
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doctrine also promotes equitable results by not requiring the shareholder 
to own shares in the corporation during the period when all relevant 
events occurred. This leaves the door open for equitable interpretations 
of what constitutes the core of the transaction, thus preserving the 
equitable nature of the shareholder derivative suit.146 Ultimately, the 
Second Circuit’s core of the conduct doctrine is superior to the 
continuing wrong doctrine because it maintains the protections that Rule 
23.1 was designed to provide while still allowing judges to distribute 
justice. 
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